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BIG BROTHER AND HIS SCIENCE KIT:
DNA DATABASES FOR 21 CENTURY
CRIME CONTROL?
PAUL E. TRACY, Ph.D.,* AND VINCENT MORGAN"
I. INTRODUCTION
Every human being carries with him from his cradle to his grave certain physical
marks which do not change their character, and by which he can always be identi-
fied-and that without shade of doubt or question. These marks are his signa-
ture, his physiological autograph, so to speak, and this autograph cannot be
counterfeited, nor can he disguise it or hide it away, nor can it become illegible by
the wear and the mutations of time. This signature is not his face-age can
change that beyond recognition; it is not his hair, for that can fall out; it is not his
height, for duplicates of that exist; it is not his form, for duplicates of that exist
also, whereas this signature is every man's very own-there is no duplicate of it
among the swarming populations of the globe!
-Pudd'nhead Wilson
Mark Twain was speaking about fingerprints, of course, but
prophetically, he might just as well have been speaking about
DNA.2 The protagonist in Pudd'nhead Wilson was an attorney
who had a passion for collecting fingerprints. One wonders if a
modern-day version of Twain's vivid character would have the
same affinity for collecting samples of DNA for law enforcement
purposes. As law enforcement agencies the world over have
been amassing huge collections of fingerprints since the closing
. Professor of Justice Studies, Sociology, and Political Economy, University of
Texas-Dallas.
Third Year Student, University of Texas-Austin, School of Law.
'MARK TW IN, PUDD'NBEAD WLSON AND THOSE EXTRAORDINARY TwiNs 108 (W.W.
Norton & Co. 1980) (1894).
2 Except for the case of identical twins, no two people have exactly the same DNA.
SeeDAvID FwS-F, HARD EVIDENCE 150 (1995).
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days of the nineteenth century,3 so too have they recently begun
to collect, organize, analyze, and store collections of DNA sam-
ples for forensic purposes.
This trend, as was the case with fingerprints, has been
hailed as a godsend for crime fighting, but also decried as an
evil at the same time. However, as with fingerprints, it looks like
DNA testing and associated databases are here to stay. Accord-
ingly, the current proliferation of DNA databases and their
likely further expansion raise three significant policy issues and
attendant questions. First, how do we utilize this new technol-
ogy, while protecting against misuse and abuse? The question is
really much more complex than this, and it certainly covers a
multitude of sub-issues. At the essential core of this issue is the
same question which appears in virtually every facet of our daily
lives today. Science and technology are progressing at expo-
nential rates, while the ordinary citizen struggles to keep up; so,
what happens when technology, and the manifold advances it
spawns, transcends society's ability to regulate such technology?
Further, in the absence of a serious and well-informed debate
about the advisability and demonstrative value of putting into
practice whatever advances new technologies may provide, will
particular interest groups exert unchallenged influence, if not
complete hegemony in a particular area, and successfully lobby
for very large expenditures of public financing?
In order to address the first issue properly, the investigation
of a second issue requires careful and immediate attention. Al-
though technology makes certain advances possible, are these
advances truly necessary? Moreover, will they produce the al-
leged benefits and if so, at what cost? This paper will not at-
tempt to solve this dilemma in a macro context. Rather, our
interest centers on the forensic application of DNA technology,
and in particular, the construction of scientific databases that
contain such information. In the past few years, supporters of
DNA testing for forensic applications have made remarkable
claims about the potential of DNA testing as a crime fighting
tool and have touted DNA as the next great breakthrough since
3 See People v.Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077, 1081-82 (Ill. 1911).
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fingerprints. It should be noted at the outset that we have no
quarrel with DNA testing per se. The scientific community has
conclusively demonstrated the reliability and validity of DNA
testing and that the "matching" of an evidence sample with that
taken from a suspect for purposes of exclusion versus inclusion
can be highly successful. Further, although at one time there
was considerable debate about the admissibility of DNA evi-
dence, the point is now moot.
4
However, our inquiry is guided by a healthy skepticism
about the widespread collection of DNA samples and their sub-
sequent storage in databases as a crime control measure. For
example, a new program in New York, announced as recently as
August 7, 1999, requires (as of December 1, 1999) that any per-
son convicted of certain designated felony offenses will have
his/her DNA stored in a database.5 The program will involve
both persons newly convicted (about 25,000 persons per year)
and the retroactive testing of persons already in the criminal
justice system (approximately 100,000 prison inmates).6 Esti-
mates of the cost of the program range from $10 million to $20
million.7
Regarding the potential of such programs as a law enforce-
ment tool, Ronald S. Neubauer, the president of the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police offered the following
comments:
I think it's one of the most important developments in forensic science
in law enforcement .... And in the 21st century, I not only see DNA be-
ing a tool to solve crimes, but as a way to insure that innocent people are
not being convicted of crimes they did not commit.8
' See Rockne P. Harmon, Lega! riticisms of DNA Typing: Where's the Bee]?, 84J. GRIM.
L. & CwMNOLOGY 175 passim (1993); PeterJ. Neufeld, Have You No Sense of Decency?,
84J. CGRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 189 passim (1993); William C. Thompson, Evaluating the
Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the "DNA War", 84 J. CGRIM. L.
& CRIMOLOGy 22 passim (1993).
5 See Richard Perez-Pena and Jayson Blair, Albany Plan Wuely Expands Sampling of
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It is precisely this type of unsupported assertion, if not bla-
tant exaggeration, concerning the crime fighting value of DNA,
together with the manifold costs of DNA testing and database
construction, that frame the scope of our analysis. To put it
more simply, will DNA databases provide law enforcement and
the subsequent criminal prosecutions with measurable and sig-
nificant effects on crime? Further, can these effects, once dem-
onstrated and replicated on a wide-scale basis, be produced in a
cost-effective manner?
Assuming that DNA databases are indeed valuable in the
fight against crime, and can be administered in a cost-effective
fashion, a final remaining issue arises concerning appropriate
regulations surrounding DNA database construction, mainte-
nance, and access. As will be shown below, since there are vari-
ous schemes concerning who should be required by statute to
contribute DNA samples, this question indeed poses significant
legal and ethical issues which must not be ignored or dismissed
amidst the fervor surrounding the alleged benefits of DNA test-
ing.
This paper is organized as follows: Part II provides a brief
introduction, to DNA testing and its increasing application in
criminal jurisprudence. In this section we devote special atten-
tion to federal initiatives that seek to expand the use of DNA
(and DNA databases) owing to its reputed evidentiary value. In
Part III we provide an analysis of the efficacy of DNA testing and
associated databases, from both a "pure" effectiveness basis (i.e.,
DNA's impact on crime) and a "cost" effectiveness standpoint
(i.e., the crime level effect per unit cost of DNA testing and
storage). Part IV reviews predictions of what the future may
hold for DNA and related databases, and the normative policy
concerns regarding current use and likely future expansion.
Here our goal is to provide informative commentary on the
fundamental question of concern: are we better off living in a
world where our most basic and singularly unique characteris-
tics are on file, serving as a constant shadow over our daily lives?
Part V provides a discussion of how DNA databases are being
designed, and a survey of the existing law in the United States as
to their present structure. Part VI offers a summary and the
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conclusions of the inquiry into the ultimate value of DNA data-
bases.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF DNA TPING
A. DNA IS DISCOVERED
The DNA story begins with two gentlemen named Watson
and Crick who came upon a remarkable discovery in 1953.
They unraveled the mystery of DNA for the first time, obtaining
a Nobel Prize for their efforts. 9 Like many scientific discoveries,
it would take years to realize the full magnitude and potential of
this pioneering work. It was not until the early 1980s that Dr.
AlecJeff-reys at the University of Leicester in England pioneered
the use of DNA in the law enforcement arena.'° The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) quickly followed suit in 1988."
DNA is the chemical deoxyribonucleic acid, which carries
the genetic code of each human's body-the genetic blueprint
we inherit from our parents. DNA, while not actually a part of
saliva, urine, perspiration, or tears, is found in one place, and
only one place-the nucleus of cells. 2 Because these cells are
found in all bodily fluids, tissue, and hair, DNA is an omnipres-
ent residue that trails us wherever we go. These physical prop-
erties of DNA have made it an important tool in fighting crime.
Presently, there are three principal methods by which DNA test-
ing is usually accomplished: (1) Restriction Fragment Length
Polymorphism (RFLP); (2) Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR);
and (3) Short Tandem Repeats (STRs).'5 Depending upon the
quantity and quality (i.e., molecular weight and possible degra-
dation) of the forensic sample available, the time frame avail-
able for testing, and other factors, one or more of these
methods will generally produce valid results for making a
"match" between an evidence sample and a suspect sample for
' For a general discussion of DNA and its discovery, see TIAE COLUMBIA
ENCYCLOPEDIA 1980-81 (Colum. Univ. Press 1993) (found under "nucleic acid").
,0 FISHER, supra note 2, at 151.
" See i&
"See ia
S See, e.g., Victor Walter Weedn & John W. Hicks, The Unrealized Potential of DNA
Testing, NAT'L INST. OFJUSTICERESEARCHAcrION,June 1998, at 7.
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purposes of excluding or failing to exclude the suspect as the
perpetrator.
B. FEDERAL DNA INITIATIVES
As might be expected, the United States Department ofJus-
tice (DOJ) has taken the lead in developing DNA applications
for use by law enforcement agencies and subsequent criminal
case disposition. The DOJ has utilized both the FBI and the re-
search and funding capabilities of the National Institute of Jus-
tice (NIJ) to develop a far reaching set of programs for DNA
applications. The FBI, as noted above, began its involvement
with DNA in 1988. Since then, the FBI has continued to play a
leading role and has developed a number of DNA initiatives.
First, the FBI maintains two DNA analysis units. DNA
Analysis Unit I performs laboratory testing on evidence samples
taken from violent crime scenes. Body fluids and fluid stains are
examined serologically and then the DNA is characterized
through RFLP and/or PCR testing. In 1996, the FBI opened
another unit, DNA Analysis Unit II, which uses mitochondrial
DNA testing on evidence samples when the sample is degraded
or contains an insufficient amount of DNA for either RFLP or
PCR testing.14 Second, the FBI operates the Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS) which began as a pilot project in 1990.
CODIS is a software-based system which uses two indices to fa-
cilitate violent crime investigations. 5 Third, the DNA Identifica-
tion Act of 1994 authorized the FBI to establish further DNA
indices.16 The Convicted Offender Index contains DNA profiles
of felons convicted of violent crimes and sex offenses, while the
Forensic Index contains DNA profiles from crime scenes. The
CODIS software permits DNA samples across the two indices to
be compared for possible matches thereby facilitating criminal
investigations. 8 Fourth, in October 1998, the FBI announced its
1 See Scientific Analysis Section, (last modified Feb. 20, 1999) <http: //www.fbi.gov/
programs/lab/org/sciana.htm>.
'5 See The National DNA Index System (Oct. 13, 1998) <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/
pressrel/pressrel98/dna.htm> (FBI Press Release).
16 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (1994).




newest tool-the National DNA Index System (NDIS). 9 The
NDIS is an electronic system that will allow federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies to contribute DNA samples to
the national database and thereby enhance the investigation of
violent crimes.20 Fifth, the FBI will soon inaugurate a Federal
Convicted Offender DNA Database. The Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 authorized the FBI to im-
plement a supplement to CODIS by requiring federal prisoners,
who are convicted of an offense against a minor or a sexually
violent offense to provide a DNA sample prior to release from a
federal correctional institution.2'
The Department of Justice has also been providing signifi-
cant leadership on DNA applications for law enforcement
through the National Institute ofJustice (NIJ). NIJ provides re-
search and program funding on a wide range of topics, includ-
ing DNA, through its Science and Technology division. Since
1986, NIJ has produced a number of significant publications on
DNA and has funded numerous projects on improving DNA
technology. 2 Arguably, an NIJ grant to the Institute for Law
and Justice achieved a milestone in DNA applications for foren-
sic purposes.2 This pioneering study investigated the use of
DNA testing to exonerate convicted offenders through a process
of post-conviction relief. Attorney General Janet Reno was so
impressed by the results of the study that she directed NIJ to es-




"See Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Hearings on
Preident's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget, Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. for
the Dept's of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 106th Cong.
(1999).
2 See e.g., Weedn & Hicks, supra note 13; Automated DNA 7ping, NAT'L INST. OF
JuSTCE RESEARCH PREVIEW (Nat'l. Inst. ofJustice, Wash., D.C.) Feb. 1997; Certification
of DNA and Other Specialists, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE UPDATE (Nat'l. Inst. of Justice,
Wash., D.C.) Sept. 1995; Getting to Fast Available, Inexpensive DNA Testing, NIJ ONLINE
NEWSLETrER (Nat'l. Inst. ofJustice, Wash., D.C.) June 1998.
' See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BYJURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996).
" See Nat'l Comm. on the Future of DNA Evidence, (last modified Jan. 16, 2000)
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nii/dna/welcome.html>.
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The Commission's agenda addresses five areas with respect
to DNA: (1) DNA in post-conviction; (2) legal issues on admissi-
bility and discovery; (3) training for crime scene collection; (4)
laboratory capabilities; and (5) the impact of future technolo-
gies.2 The Commission has held five meetings since its incep-
tion in March 1998. The work of the Commission is available in
the Proceedings of the five meetings, which span some 500
26pages.
III. DNA EFFECTVENESS: THEORYVS. REA=
A. HOW DNA DATABASES ARE THEORETICALLY SUPPOSED TO
WORK
In theory, a DNA database consists of DNA samples ob-
tained from two sources: crime scene evidence and individual
"donors."2 The term "donors" is used simply for utility here,
and as Part V.B will show, who is included in the donor group
varies substantially from jurisdiction tojurisdiction. It should be
noted here that other sources of DNA might provide samples
for these databases, such as unidentified human remains or the
DNA of relatives of missing persons.28 However, these records
typically constitute only a small part of the average DNA data-
base, and consequently, will be disregarded for the purposes of
this paper.
Once a DNA sample intended for storage in a DNA data-
base is obtained, it is sent to a DNA laboratory for processing.
Once it has been analyzed, the results are stored in a central da-
tabase.2 After this process is completed, the results of every
DNA specimen in that database can be compared with every
other sample in the database, and these samples can also be
checked against new samples taken from people, crime scenes,
or otherwise obtained elsewhere.
2 See id.
26 See id.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (1994).
SeM e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-18-24 (1998).
2 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102 i toj (998).
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The ultimate value of a crime-fighting measure depends,
not upon theory, or exaggerated speculations, or even anecdo-
tal accounts, but rather on the real-world effectiveness of the
technique. Thus, collection and study of empirical data is cru-
cial to evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of such
methods. 0 The remainder of this section will first analyze the
effectiveness of DNA databases from a crime-level or "pure ef-
fectiveness" standard and then consider the additional factor of
cost to determine the ultimate value of DNA databases.
B. PURE EFFECTIVENESS
Clearly, because the DNA databases are relative newcomers
to the fight against crime, they have yet to make a significant
impact on crime rates. This should not, however, be viewed as a
failure, at least at this early juncture in their history. Due to the
very nature of a database, its utility theoretically increases pro-
portionally as the amount of data contained in it expands.
Therein lies the problem: DNA analysis is still quite time con-
suming, and this has led to a massive backlog of unanalyzed
samples in our nation's crime laboratories. This backup may
contain as many as 450,000 samples waiting to be analyzed.8 ' As
of the date of this writing, the Texas Department of Public
Safety had analyzed just over one-half of the samples it had re-
ceived. As these backlogs begin to recede, the effectiveness of
the databases will continue to rise.32 Crime labs across the coun-
try are continuing to expand and upgrade their existing tech-
nology, and the technology itself is rapidly progressing."
'0 In this vein, our focus on empirical data to evaluate the wisdom of a particular
law reminds us ofJustice Holmes' admonition, "[F] or the rational study of the law the
black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man
of statistics and the master of economics." OLrVER WENDELL HoLMES, JRL, COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPEaS 187 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1921). Thus, it is with this guiding princi-
ple in mind that we turn to the analysis of statistical evidence to determine the true
utility of DNA databases.
s Richard Willing, With DNA Databases on Fast Track, Legal Questions Loom, USA
TODAY, Mar. 1, 1999, at 5A.
"Seegeneraly Weedn & Hicks, supra note 13.
Robin Lloyd, Lab on a Chip May Turn Police Into DNA Detectives, WASH. PoST, Mar.
1, 1999, at A3.
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Despite the backlogs, anecdotal evidence has already dem-
onstrated that DNA databases can have remarkable effectiveness
in solving crimes. For example, while these databases were still
in their infancy, a brutal rape-murder in Illinois was solved using
the Illinois DNA database.34 A young man was murdered, and
his wife was raped, shot point-blank in the head, and left for
dead.' More than a year and a half later, the police had no
solid leads.- Forensic specialists obtained a DNA profile from
the perpetrator's semen, and compared that with the Illinois
DNA database. 7 At the time, this database had only 600 samples
on file from convicted sex offenders.38 Despite this handicap,
the crime scene evidence matched DNA from a man who had
already served time for sexual assault.39
In Texas, the first "cold hit"40 occurred in May 1998, when
DNA evidence recovered from crime victims was matched
against a DNA record on file in the Texas DNA database.4' In
this case, two young Granbury girls were sexually assaulted in
1993 in a dry creek bed near their home.42 Authorities had no
leads on the case.43 However, the perpetrator was subsequently
convicted of a 1995 sexual assault.44 As a result of the convic-
tion, his DNA was sampled and included in the Texas DNA da-
tabase.4 The crime scene evidence from the 1993 incident was
run against the state database and it matched the suspect.46 Af-
ter further tests were taken to confirm the match, the suspect,






40 "Cold hit" is a term used to describe a situation where law enforcement has no
leads in a case, but run biological evidence recovered from the crime scene against a
DNA database. A "cold hit" occurs when a match is found, identifying a potential
suspect who was unknown before.
41 Rebeca Rodriguez, Texas Officers Solve 1st Crime UsingDNA Database, Hope for More,








who was still serving time for the 1995 assault, confessed to the
rapes.
Nationwide, the FBI database has produced some 583 cold
hits to date. The National FBI database (CODIS) currently
contains DNA samples from over forty-two states, and is ex-
pected to include DNA from all fifty states within the near fu-
ture.49 England, which started its DNA database before the FBI,
has had over 28,000 matches.5 0 The scope of Britain's database
is considerably wider in terms of whose DNA is included than
that of most United States jurisdictions,51 and it already has
more than 360,000 samples indexed and on file. 2 It is expected
to eventually encompass more than one third of all English men
between the ages of sixteen and thirty."s
These isolated successes of DNA databases are interesting
and laudatory. However, they do not provide systematic, con-
clusive, and widespread evidence that such databases, especially
the expanded or "all-inclusive" variety, will be proven useful in
the fight against crime. Are we to conclude that these few ex-
amples will increase dramatically as the databases proliferate
and become interconnected? In order to address this funda-
mental question, we provide data below that exposes the useful-
ness of DNA databases to a proper scientific test on data
concerning law enforcement as well as prosecutorial functions
in the fight against crime.
1. DNA Effectiveness: Law Enforcement
There are two basic applications for DNA in law enforce-
ment, and these two widely divergent applications must be dif-
ferentiated so that the proper focus of our inquiry will be clear.
First, there is DNA testing concerning known suspects and evi-
47 See id.
" See Lloyd, supra note 33.
49
l.
' Nicholas Wade, National DNA Database to Debut as Anti-Crime Tool, DALLAS
MoRNiNGNEws, Oct. 12, 1998, atAl.
", The English system allows for samples to be taken on arrest, much like the up-
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dence samples. Here, the DNA extracted from bodily fluids or
tissue found at a crime scene (e.g., blood or semen), or a vic-
tim's DNA extracted from residue left on an offender (e.g., the
victim's blood) are compared to determine if there is a match.
It would seem that in the absence of other explanatory informa-
don, a DNA match or non-match would be dispositive of the
suspect's involvement in or his/her innocence of the crime. We
wholeheartedly and unequivocally endorse this particular use of
DNA testing with known offenders, and further, encourage its
use as broadly as possible. The only meaningful caveats we
would offer involve proper training for crime-scene technicians
and laboratory personnel as well as sound certification policies
and well-conceived oversight and monitoring processes for both
evidence collection and subsequent DNA testing.
5 4
However, a second (and highly touted) use of DNA con-
cerns the construction of massive DNA databases to facilitate
what we shall refer to as the "DNA mining process." As noted
above, the logic behind DNA databases appears convincing, and
concomitantly, such databases are touted as major crime fight-
ing tools. It would seem to make sense that all that society
needs do to fight crime effectively is: (1) capture the DNA from
known offenders (the exact selection of offenders remains open
to debate); (2) store the DNA in a database; and (3) compare
the offender bank DNA with that taken from crime scenes. The
promised results of course will be the identification and subse-
quent arrest of a suspect and his or her successful prosecution
owing to the DNA match, a result which would not have been
possible but for the DNA database. However, when one exam-
ines the nature and distribution of crime, the presumed useful-
ness of DNA databases as a crime control measure may not only
be far from obvious or certain, but may turn out to be grossly
exaggerated. We thus turn to a consideration of crime events
and their susceptibility to DNA applications in law enforcement.




a. Effectiveness Test #1: UCR Index Crimes
TABLE 1.











Motor Vehicle Theft 1,353,700
Property Subtotal 11,540,300
Total Index Crimes 13,175,100

























In Table 1, data are displayed concerning Index offenses
reported to the police and published in the FBI's Uniform
Crime Reports for 1997 (the most current data available)."5 In
1997, there were 13,175,100 Index offenses reported to the
FBI.56 Index offenses are deemed to be the most serious of-
fenses and are classified as Index crimes, or Part I crimes. Vio-
lent Index crimes, which number 1,634,770 offenses, account
for only 12.4% of all Index crimes. The vast majority of Index
crimes, some 11,540,300 offenses, are crimes against property,
accounting for 87.6% of all Index offenses. Further, the rates
(per 100,000 persons) clearly indicate that people are at much
greater risk of being victims of property offenses than violent
crimes, considering that property crimes occur at a rate of
4,311.9 per 100,000, a rate which is seven times higher than that
for violent Index crimes (610.8 per 100,000).
5' FEDERAL BUREAU OF INvSTGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS (1997).
"The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports Index offenses include: murder and non-
negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and ve-
hicle theft.
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Clearly, the vast majority of serious crime is committed
against property and not people. Accordingly, the vast majority
of law enforcement responses consist of the following: respond-
ing to the scene, conducting interviews for purposes of writing a
contact report, and subsequent follow-up investigation (usually
by detectives). Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of all
police responses involve a property offense in which the victim
seldom, if ever, sees or confronts the offender, and very likely
has no idea who the offender may be. Further, it is highly likely
that these voluminous property offenses do not occur with
much trace evidence (even fingerprints) left at the scene, evi-
dence which the police actually collect and upon which they can
subsequently base their investigation.57
TABLE 2.
CRIME INDEX OFFENSES REPORTED TO FBI
AND CLEARED BYARREST iN 1997
Index Offense Crimes Known Percent Cleared by Arrest
Murder/Non-Negligent
Manslaughter 14,759 66.1%
Forcible Rape 78,975 50.8%
Robbery 411,137 26.3%
Aggravated Assault 838,711 58.5%
Violence Subtotal 1,343,642 48.3%
Burglary 2,044,918 13.8%
Larceny 6,392,542 19.8%
Motor Vehicle Theft 1,147,391 14.0%
Property Subtotal 9,584,841 17.9%
Arson 76,018 17.5%
Total Index Crimes 11,004,501 21.6%
1997 UNwORM CRIME REP. FOR -M U.S., § M, AT 214
The lack of physical evidence in property crimes further
suggests that Index crimes will likely have differential arrest
rates owing to the circumstances surrounding the event, particu-
larly the availability of witnesses or the face-to-face victimization




of violent offenses as opposed to the impersonal victimization of
property offenses. The data in Table 2 represent the Index of-
fenses "cleared" by the arrest of a suspect and attest to the gen-
eral ineffectiveness with which law enforcement solves major
crimes. As would be expected, the police are more successful in
arresting suspects in violent crimes (average of 48.3%; 66.1% of
murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 50.8% of rapes,
26.3% of robberies, and 58.5% of aggravated assaults) than in
property crimes (average 17.5%; 13.8% of burglaries, 19.8% of
larceny/theft, and 14.0% of vehicle thefts).
The property offense data are especially noteworthy. The
data indicate that 9,584,841 property Index crimes were re-
ported by police agencies that also reported clearance data. De-
spite this substantial crime volume, only 17.9% were solved by
arrest; therefore, 7,869,154 offenses did not result in the arrest
of a suspect.
We come then to the issue of Effectiveness Test #1. In order
for the UCR Index crimes to represent viable candidates for be-
ing solved by "DNA mining," there would have to be careful and
painstaking crime scene investigation. In particular, the crime
scene response would have to include forensic technicians and
crime scene technicians (or "criminalists," as they are often
called) who would scour the crime scene looking for trace evi-
dence like blood, other bodily fluids, tissue, hair, etc., which
carries the DNA of the perpetrator. Thus, the success of the
DNA mining expedition for crime-fighting depends on three
fundamental prerequisites: First, the criminal has to leave evi-
dence behind at the crime scene, or on the person or clothing
of the victim, that contains the criminal's DNA. Second, a
trained technician must search the crime scene for this evi-
dence. Third, the DNA-bearing evidence has to be, in fact,
found, collected, and be of sufficient quantity and quality to
permit DNA testing.
Let us be realistic here about the likelihood of these three
prerequisites actually taking place, rather than permit ourselves
to be swept up in the euphoria exemplified by the proponents
of DNA mining. What do the groups of serious offenses classi-
fied by FBI as Index offenses tell us? The answer is straightfor-
20001
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ward-that DNA databases will not be greatly successful in in-
creasing the extent to which police solve the vast majority of In-
dex crimes. There are two principal and inescapable reasons
for this conclusion. First, law enforcement already does a more
than creditable job (i.e., greater than 50% clearance) of solving
three out of the four violent Index crimes (66.1% of murders;
50.8% of rapes; and 58.5% of aggravated assaults). Second, as
we have shown, the vast majority of Index crimes are property
offenses, and this offense type does not carry a high potential
for beneficial DNA testing, owing to the fact that the usual
property offense crime scene is not likely to have the perpetra-
tor's DNA, and even if it does, such evidence will hardly be
looked for, let alone collected and tested for comparison to the
databases.
b. Effectiveness Test #2: Non-Index crimes
The argument could be made that Index crimes are not the
only offenses worthy of consideration, that there are countless
other felonies which come to the attention of the police, for
which DNA mining would be beneficial. These other offenses
are known as "Non-Index" crimes.5s They are deemed to be less
serious than Index offenses, and, accordingly, the FBI does not
publish counts concerning the number of such offenses that are
reported to the thousands of law enforcement agencies across
the country. 9 The FBI does, however, publish data concerning
the arrests of suspects for Non-Index events. Table 3 provides
FBI estimates of the number of persons arrested in 1997 for the
Index crimes and the large category referred to as Non-Index
crimes.
The arrest data indicate that only 17.8% of all arrests in the
United States involve Index crimes,6° and further, only 4.7% of
total arrests concern violent Index crimes, while 13.0% involve
property Index offenses. 61 The vast majority of arrests, 82.2%,
concern Non-Index, or less serious, offenses; of these, only






10.7% concern crimes against persons.62 Thus, even if we ignore
the Index vs. Non-Index distinction, only 15.4% of all arrests
concern a violent crime (however serious or minor) against a
person.'
TABLE 3.
ESTIMATED ARRESTS FOR INDEX AND NON-INDEX OFFENSES
REPORTED TO FBI IN 1997




Total Index Arrests 2,733,400 17.8%
Non-Index Offense
Against Person 1,653,600 10.7%
Other 11,004,100 71.5%
Total Non-Index Arrests 12,547,700 82.2%
Total Index Crimes 15,284,300 100.0%
1997 UNirORM CRIME REP. FORTHE U.S., § IV, AT 222.
Table 4 provides detail about the distribution of arrests
across the Index crimes. Clearly, law enforcement activity is
substantially devoted to the arrest of persons for crimes other
than those involving violence against one or more victims.
These data show that only 26.3% of arrests for Index crimes in-
volve violence against a personal victim.64 Similarly, Table 5
provides identical data on the arrests made for Non-Index of-
fenses. Again, arrests for violent Non-Index offenses account
for only 13% of all the arrests for Non-Index crimes.6' The re-
maining 87% of Non-Index arrests concern a variety of criminal
behaviors that are not serious and do not involve any type of as-
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TABLE4.
ESTIMATED ARRESTS FOR CRIME INDEX OFFENSES
REPORTED TO FBI IN 1997
Index Offense Persons Arrested Percent of Total
Murder/Non-Negligent
Manslaughter 18,290 0.6%
Forcible Rape 32,060 1.2%
Robbery 132,450 4.8%
Aggravated Assault 534,920 19.6%
Violence Subtotal 717,750 26.2%
Burglary 356,000 13.0%
Larceny 1,472,600 53.9%
Motor Vehicle Theft 167,000 6.1%
Property Subtotal 2,015,600 73.0%
Arson 20,000 0.7%
Total Index Crimes 2,733,320 100.0%
1997 UNIwORM CRIME REP. FORTHE U.S., § IV, AT 222
Regarding Effectiveness Test #2, the conclusion is as inescap-
able as was the case for Test #1. Law enforcement activity pro-
duces arrests for Non-Index crimes, which involve "other"
crimes much more often (87%) than for violent crimes (13%).
To what extent, then, will DNA mining be beneficial for the vast
majority of Non-Index crimes? Realistically, the answer must be
that DNA testing is quite irrelevant for these offenses. These
are, by all accounts, less serious crimes, and local law enforce-
ment hardly has the necessary resources to treat these offenses
as though they require the intensive crime scene effort that is
usually reserved for violent crimes against the person.
An alternative perspective on the availability of DNA-
bearing evidence and its collection potential, however, has been
advanced elsewhere. Weedn and Hicks have noted that "at most
crime scenes, there are many kinds of biological evidence: not
only blood and hair but also botanical, zoological, and other
types of substances."67 The authors advance their argument by
citing data collected in one study revealing that blood evidence
was found in 60% of murders and in a similar percentage of




ESTIMATED ARRESTS FOR NON-INDEX OFFENSES
REPORTED TO FBI IN 1997
Non-Index Offense Persons Arrested Percent of Total
Against Person
Other Assaults 1,395,800 11.0%
Sex Offenses (not Rape) 101,900 0.8%




Disorderly Conduct 811,100 6.4%




Forgery & Counterfeiting 120,100 0.9%
Fraud 414,600 3.3%
Gambling 15,900 0.1%








All Other Offenses 3,884,600 30.7%
1997 UNIwoRM CMIME REP. FOTMI U.S., § IV, AT 222.
assaults and batteries, while hair was found at the scene of 10%
of robberies and 6% of residential burglaries.6 It is obvious, of
course, that the authors' use of the word "most" above is sheer
hyperbole. There is no conceivable way that DNA-related evi-
dence found at the scene of only 10% of robberies and 6% of
burglaries can be considered to qualify as "most" crimes. In
fact, the data would suggest the alternative-that DNA-bearing
evidence is available at only a small number of crime scenes. It
is likely, of course, that the authors are really arguing that DNA-
68 &i
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related material is theoretically available at some crime scenes
and could be and should be collected more often than is pres-
ently done, thereby aiding the investigation. Thus, they note
that:
saliva, skin cells, bone, teeth, tissue, urine, feces, and a host of other bio-
logical specimens, all of which may be found at crime scenes are also
sources of DNA. Saliva may be found in chewing gum and on cigarette
butts, envelopes, and possibly drinking cups. Fingernail scrapings from
an assault victim or a broken fingernail left at the scene by the perpetra-
tor may also be useful DNA evidentiary 8ecimens. Even hatbands and
other articles of clothing may yield DNA.
We readily accept the notion that there may be biological
specimens left at some crime scenes that could quite readily
yield DNA for testing. But, we repeat our admonition outlined
above: while there may be such evidence available at crime
scenes, it is highly unlikely that police departments have suffi-
cient resources to look for such evidence across the wealth of
crimes with which they must concern themselves. Weedn and
Hicks are well aware of this as they state "little of this evidence is
recovered from crime scenes, less is submitted to crime labs,
and still less is analyzed."70 The reasons are obvious. It is often
difficult enough to convince the police to dust for fingerprints
at a residential burglary because the police know that their
search will likely be futile. Imagine, therefore, trying to con-
vince police to search the crime scene (usually outside) of a
robbery for such evidence as the perpetrator's hair, tissue, or
other biological residue. Or imagine further, a crowded park-
ing lot outside a bar or night club that was the scene of an as-
sault. Here, the police would be expected to hunt for a broken
fingernail or the victim would have to turn over his or her cloth-
ing so that a search for trace evidence could be conducted.
Thus, it is unrealistic to argue that DNA is readily available
at crime scenes if only the police would look for it. Assuming
that the legitimate law enforcement reluctance to treat every
crime scene, regardless of how serious, as if it were a homicide
or a rape could be overcome, where will the resources come
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from to look for the biological evidence, collect it, test it, and
store it in a DNA database? It must be recognized that the front
end of the process, the crime scene, is highly labor intensive,
and it is doubtful that local law enforcement has such resources
available. Weedn and Hicks have specifically noted that the
scarce resources available to law enforcement which must be
distributed across a range of pressing needs is a significant limi-
tation to DNA as a crime-fighting tool."' Moreover, not only is
the process highly labor intensive, that labor tends to be highly
trained, and therefore, more expensive. Further, even if such
resources could be made available somehow, the question arises
as to whether this is a wise expenditure of public resources. It
should be stressed that we do not wish to suggest abandoning
current forensic evidence collection practices, but only that
there are significant and numerous obstacles to realizing sub-
stantial crime-reduction results from this process.
2. DNA Effectiveness: Prosecution
The other stage of the criminal justice system for which
DNA mining (and the DNA databases) could be most beneficial
concerns the prosecution of criminal defendants. Just because
DNA mining might not dramatically increase the rate at which
crimes are solved by the police, there are still advantages to the
prosecutorial use of DNA results. DNA could produce the fol-
lowing benefits: (1) convictions could be more likely; (2) con-
victions without undue plea-bargaining could occur more often;
(3) some, if not many, defendants may even plead guilty in the
face of such strong forensic evidence; (4) some defendants who
might not otherwise be brought to trial could be convicted; and
(5) some suspects would be exonerated before trial, thus spar-
ing the necessity of a trial-both the expense as well as unneces-
sary discomfort and embarrassment for the wrongfully accused.
Naturally, this list is not meant to be exhaustive, but merely sug-
gestive of DNA's potential in court. It would seem, therefore,
that DNA use by prosecutors would be universally high as it
would be difficult to assemble reasons to the contrary.
7' Id. at 4.
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TABLE 6.
PROSECUTORIAL USE OF DNA EVIDENCE: 1992-1996
Percent of Offices Using DNA
Population Served 1992 1994 1996
All Offices 25% 42% 49.2%
500,000 or More n.a. 95% n.a.
Under 500,000 n.a. 47% n.a.
Part-Time Office n.a. 23.% n.a.
1,000,000 or More n.a. n.a. 100.0%
250,000 to 999,999 n.a. n.a. 97.6%
Under 250,000 n.a. n.a. 56.4%
Part-Time Office n.a. n.a. 15.3%
John M. Dawson et al., Prosecutors in State Courts, 1992, BuREAuJusT. STAT. BULL, Dec.
1993, at 1; Carol J. DeFrances et al., Prosecutors in State Courts, 1994, BUREAu JUST.
STAT. BuLT.., Oct. 1996, at 4; CarolJ. DeFrances et al., Prosecutors in State Courts, 1996,
BUREAUJUsT. STAT. Buu-.,July 1998, at 6.
Table 6 provides the results of three years worth of data
from an ongoing Bureau of Justice Statistics study of the na-
tion's prosecutors' offices.72 The data displayed are from the
last three installments of the research: 1992, 1994, and 1996.
Overall, the results indicate that the use of DNA by prosecutors
increased from 25% in 1992 to 42% in 1994, then to 49.2% in
1996 .7 In the 1994 survey, the data were available by size of of-
fice, and these results show that when the prosecutor's office
serves a very large population (500,000 citizens or more), almost
all such offices (95%) use DNA as compared to the offices serv-
ing smaller populations (47% for populations under 500,000,
and 23% for a part-time office). The 1996 survey provides a dif-
ferent population breakdown with four categories rather than
three. Again we see that as the population served increases,
there is a corresponding increase in DNA use by the prosecu-
tion. The use of DNA ranges from 100% for populations of one
million or greater, to 97.6% for populations of 250,000-999,999,
"BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATITCS, PROSEcUTORS IN STATE COURTS (1998); BUREAU OF
JUsTICE STATISTIcs, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COuRT (1996); BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE CoURTs (1993).




to 56.4% for jurisdictions with populations under 250,000, and
finally, to 15.3% for part-time offices.
TABLE 7.
PROSECUTORIAL USE OF DNA EVIDENCE BYPOPULATION GROUP, STAGE
OF CASE, AND OFFENSE, 1996
Population Served by Prosecutor
Use of DNA All 1,000,000+ 250,000 to Less Than Part
999,999 250,000 Time
Used Any Time 49.2% 100.0% 97.6% 56.4% 15.3%
Plea Negotiations 41.1% 90.9% 84.1% 48.3% 9.8%
Trial 34.2% 100.0% 91.8% 36.7% 9.8%
Murder/Manslaughter 27.5% 93.8% 87.5% 28.8% 4.2%
Sex Offense 42.7% 100.0% 96.4% 46.5% 15.3%
Aggravated Assault 4.2% 36.4% 13.7% 4.2% 0.0%
Robbery 2.9% 15.2% 13.7% 2.6% 0.0%
Burglary 2.7% 21.2% 12.6% 2.3% 0.0
CarolJ. DeFrancis & Greg W. Steadman, Prosecutor in State Courts, 1996, BUREAUJUSr.
STAT. BULLJuly 1998, at 6.
Table 7 provides data from the 1996 survey concerning how
prosecutors used DNA evidence. Overall, the results show that
less than half of all prosecutors (49.2%) use DNA in any man-
ner. More particularly, only 41.1% use DNA evidence during
plea negotiations, while even less, 34.2%, use DNA at trial. With
respect to DNA use by type of crime charged, the data once
again suggest that use is limited and generally restricted to two
offenses. That is, 27.5% of prosecutors use DNA evidence for
murder and non-negligent manslaughter cases, while 42.7% use
such evidence in sex offenses. The remaining three offense
types show extremely low levels of DNA use: aggravated as-
sault-4.2%; robbery-2.9%, and burglary-2.7%.
There are, however, two basic findings that are readily ap-
parent in the data when population groupings are considered.
These findings suggest population differentials in the use of
DNA evidence, and they also suggest that there are distinct
crime-type differences. First, like the result concerning whether
DNA was used at all (Table 6), the type of use varies by size of
population served. The two larger population groups (1 million
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or more and 250,000-999,999) make extensive use of DNA at
both trial and during plea negotiations. On the other hand, the
two smaller groupings (less than 250,000 and part-time offices)
are much less likely to use DNA at trial or during plea negotia-
tions. Second, the data also display very significant crime type
variation in the use of DNA. That is, the two larger population
groups use DNA evidence at a substantial rate for murder or
non-negligent manslaughter (93.8% and 87.5%) and sex of-
fenses (100% and 96.4%), but the two smaller population
groups do not use DNA evidence in the majority of cases for ei-
ther murder or non-negligent manslaughter (28.8% and 4.2%)
or sex offenses (46.5% and 15.3%). Additionally, the data con-
firm our suspicion that other crime types beyond homicides and
rapes are not readily susceptible to DNA evidence. That is, for
neither aggravated assault, robbery, nor burglary do any of the
prosecution groups exceed 36.4% in the use of DNA. In fact,
from 79% to 100% of the time, the various offices do not use
DNA evidence for two major violent crimes (robbery and aggra-
vated assaults) or a major property crime (burglary).
These results are highly pertinent to the question of DNA
effectiveness, as even those prosecution offices (i.e., the two
largest groups) that use DNA evidence extensively do not use
such evidence beyond the two most serious crime types. One
can only wonder why this is the result. Is it because such evi-
dence is not collected or tested and, therefore, is not available?
Or, could it be that the crime types in question do not require
DNA evidence to make a case sound enough to go to trial?
It might be argued that the variation in DNA use across
population groups is not very important because Table 7 indi-
cates that at least the largest counties use DNA evidence from
about 84% to 100% of the time. Moreover, according to the
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), the larger cities and counties
(those with populations greater than 500,000) represent about
49% of the total United States population.7 By implication,
therefore, at least one-half of crimes are being prosecuted by of-
fices that use DNA evidence extensively. Since BJS does not
7
4 BuRF.Au oFJusncE STATiSncs, supra note 72.
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provide a list of these 127 prosecutors' offices, we cannot per-
form a direct test of the population covered. However, we can
use FBI data to perform an approximate test, giving every bene-
fit of the doubt to the BJS claims. These data are displayed in
Table 8.
Table 8 provides population data by various groupings and
also provides UCR Index crime counts for these same group-
ings. Using these FBI data we are unable to replicate the 49%
population figure. We come up with a total for the large popu-
lation areas, those with at least 500,000 residents, of about
78,316,000. This was achieved by adding the population for
Group I, 1 million or more (20,922,000), plus Group II,
500,000-999,999 (11,084,000), plus all of the suburban counties
(46,310,000). Therefore, our calculations indicate that the two
largest population areas, together with all the suburban coun-
ties equals about 35.6% of the United States population. Need-
less to say, this lack of congruence is problematic.
Next, we account for the percentage of UCR Index crimes
that occur and are reported to the FBI for these three popula-
tion groups that encompass densely populated areas. The re-
sults are as follows: (1) UCR Index crime-35.1%; (2) UCR
violent Index crimes-42.6%; and (3) UGR property Index
crimes-34%. With the exception of a slightly disproportionate
share of serious violent crimes, the largest population groups
taken together account for basically the same amount of crime
(34% to 35.1%) as their share of the population (35.6%) would
suggest. Further, Table 9 indicates that there are no startling
differentials in the extent to which the larger areas succeed in
clearing the Index crimes by arrest. In fact, Table 9 generally
indicates that it is the smaller areas that do a better job of arrest-
ing suspects regardless of the severity of the crime.
We come then to Effectiveness Test #3. As was the case previ-
ously with respect to law enforcement, the federal government's
own data regarding prosecutors would suggest that DNA is not
used by a majority of prosecutors' offices. There were popula-
tion differentials showing greater use in the most populous ar-
eas. However, the extensive use by prosecutors serving the
largest population groupings must be discounted by the fact
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TABLE 8.





Population Group Total Index Violent
All 220,142,000 11,097,248 1,407,924
Group I






Group H 100-249K 1,530,238 187,752
22,084,000 13.8% 13.3%
Group III 50-99K 1,169,925 131,733
21,279,000 10.5% 9.4%
Group IV 25-49K 1,009,981 96,307
20,878,000 9.1% 6.8%
Group V 10-24K 968,773 81,972
22,577,000 8.7% 5.8%
Group VI >10K 806,401 64,668
18,279,000 7.3% 4.6%
Suburban Counties 1,599,605 176,619
46,310,000 14.4% 12.5%
Rural Counties 507,674 55,422
22,903,000 4.6% 3.9%
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TABLE 9.
PERCENT OF OFFENSES CLEARED BYARREST BY POPULATION GROUP AND
INDEX OFFENSE TYPE, 1997
Population Group .
All 221,223,000 21.6 48.3 17.9 66.1 50.8 58.5 26.3 13.8
Group I
1 mil. + 16.7 38.0 11.5 60.1 46.0 50.3 20.5 9.4
18,156,000
500-999K 19.3 43.4 15.1 55.8 55.2 55.7 25.3 13.2
10,382,000
250-499K 18.7 41.8 14.5 61.1 50.3 52.2 24.2 10.6
12,024,000
Group 11 100-249K 21.2 47.9 17.5 69.1 51.2 59.0 27.6 12.8
19,631,000
Group M 50-99K 22.5 49.0 19.2 71.0 46.8 59.7 27.7 13.7
22,613,000
Group IV 25-49K 22.7 49.8 19.8 69.8 44.6 58.2 29.5 13.5
21,496,000
Group V 10-24K 26.0 55.3 23.2 71.9 49.6 62.4 34.5 15.9
23,519,000
Group VI >10K 24.8 61.3 21.5 74.9 55.2 66.7 36.3 17.0
19,329,000
Suburban Counties 21.7 54.9 17.4 68.8 54.9 62.7 29.6 18.6
50,186,000
Rural Counties 23.9 62.2 19.2 77.2 52.0 65.3 42.2 17.0
23,887,000
1997 UNIFoRM CRimE REP. FORTHE U.S., § III, AT 213-14.
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that these offices handle only about one-third of the serious
crime in the United States. The vast majority of crime, about
64%, occurs in smaller jurisdictions-jurisdictions served by
prosecutor units that do not rely on DNA evidence to a great ex-
tent, either at trial or during plea negotiations, regardless of the
severity of the crime being prosecuted. Our analysis of the
available data leads us to one inescapable conclusion: DNA use
is a big city or large county phenomenon, but the majority of
crime is committed and prosecuted elsewhere.
C. COST-EFFEriNESS
DNA mining has been shown above, at least anecdotally, to
have the capability to match crime scene evidence with known
offender samples. With respect to routine police and prosecu-
torial functions, however, DNA evidence is not being used ex-
tensively. Further, there appear to be distinct limitations to its
capability to fight crime on any large scale, especially at the law
enforcement and investigatory stages. Thus, it may seem un-
necessary to consider cost-effectiveness. But, since DNA mining
is here to stay, and its use appears likely to expand even further
to include more and more donors (arrestees, convicted felons,
perhaps even the general public) it is important to assess
whether using DNA testing is cost-effective. At some point, con-
sideration of allocating scarce law enforcement resources must
be factored into the DNA mining equation, especially if success-
ful "hits" remain few and far between. The alternative, of
course, is that an overabundance of public expenditures might
be allocated to DNA mining, even though it is not nearly as ef-
fective as has been claimed. There are several issues that war-
rant careful study in this regard. First, are DNA databases cost-
effective right now? If not, will they be cost-effective at some
point in the future? Even if such expenditures are the most ef-
ficient use of the resources allocated to crime fighting, do we
really have sufficient resources to make the necessary and sub-
stantial fiscal outlays in order to capitalize on these new tech-
nologies?
The answers to all of these questions and more control the
debate over whether allocating funds to these databases make
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economic sense. In one sense, however, it seems ludicrous to
talk about cost-effectiveness at all when one reviews the anecdo-
tal evidence of databases that have provided the only means for
solving some crimes.7 What is the value of solving a brutal rape
of two young sisters who were forced to watch as the perpetrator
violently assaulted one and then the other? It seems that almost
any amount of money could be justified as a reasonable expen-
diture. But, isolated successes are not the proper framework for
examining the cost-effectiveness of DNA databases. The proper
focus should be whether society is better off by spending money
on these databases, which, as has been demonstrated above,
may have a very low yield, as opposed to allocating the resources
to other crime-fighting techniques.
As DNA laboratories all over the nation continue to up-
grade existing technology, the capital investments will likely de-
cline.76 Once these laboratories are fully equipped to handle
DNA analysis on a large scale, the marginal cost of each analysis
should decrease accordingly. It currently costs approximately
$50 to construct a DNA profile from a sample. 7 This year alone,
the National Institute of Justice has begun distribution of $5
million in grants to speed DNA analysis technology." The Na-
tional Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence has pre-
dicted that it would cost an estimated $22 million just to analyze
the existing nationwide backlog of DNA samples.7 New York
City Police Commissioner Howard Safir has proposed taking a
DNA sample from "anyone who is arrested for anything."8° It
has been estimated that this would cost New York City alone
some $18.25 million per year."' If this were expanded on a na-
75 See supra Part III.B.
7, Ed Housewright, Crime Lab's Excellence is Evidenced by Work Done in Cramped Quar-
ters, DALLaS MORNING NEws, Jan. 24, 1999, at Al (reporting that the Dallas County
Criminal Investigation Laboratory purchased three new DNA analysis machines at
$60,000 each).
7 See supra note 24.
78 See supra note 24.
Kendall Anderson, Panel Debates Taking DNA upon Arrest DALLAS MORNING NEWS
Mar. 2, 1999, atA13.
o Stevenson Swanson, Ideas for Wdespread DNA Tingerprinting' Stir Debate, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 7, 1999, atA15.
1 See supra note 24.
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tionwide basis, it would result in about 15.3 million additional
tests each year. When multiplied by the cost of each test, this
additional expense would come to some $765 million annually
(adjusted downward, of course, for offenders with multiple ar-
rests).
These figures may seem daunting, but again, when com-
pared to the costs of crime each year, and when compared to
the efficacy of existing crime-fighting techniques, these expen-
ditures may well be justified to some observers. It is also widely
accepted that the costs of DNA testing will continue to decrease
as technology improves. 2 Moreover, the increased use of DNA
evidence could conceivably reduce the costs associated with tra-
ditional police investigations.8 Further, the utility of DNA as
evidence should reduce backlogs in our court systems, and may
serve to deter recidivism, thereby further justifying the expendi-
ture on a cost-effectiveness basis.8 The use of DNA has been
touted as one of the most effective tools our law enforcement
agencies have ever had to fight crime. It is also claimed that
DNA databases might diminish the cost of policing, investigat-
ing, and prosecuting criminal cases. These and other benefits
make the expense seem more than worthwhile despite DNA
mining's limited direct effect on crime-solving thus far.
It is difficult to locate precise figures on the cost of con-
structing and maintaining the current databases, and further, it
remains unclear which category of offenders (or even people
generally), and consequently, how many people, will have to
contribute their DNA to the various databases. Notwithstanding
the above limitations, we can offer a close examination concern-
ing the cost-effectiveness of one of the newest databases to come
on the scene: the Federal Convicted Offender DNA Database.
As noted in Part II.B, the FBI has recently been authorized to
implement a DNA database of data collected prior to release
from a federal correctional institution from federal offenders
convicted of an offense against a minor or a sexually violent of-
82 SeeWeedn & Hicks, supra note 13.
" See id.
8' See W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-2 (Supp. 1999) (legislative findings that DNA databases
may serve to discourage recidivism).
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fense.' The FBI, in its budget request for fiscal year 2000, ad-
vised the House Committee on Appropriations that it would re-
quire $5,336,000 to implement the new federal database.6 We
are curious, if not very skeptical. Why will it cost such a substan-
tial amount of money to add yet another database? Is there not
a principle of "economy of scale" by which supplementing an al-
ready existing database (i.e., CODIS) could be accomplished
without duplicating costs? Perhaps it is because there will be a
considerable number of federal inmates subjected to the new
program, thereby justifying the high cost.
In order to estimate the number of federal inmates who
qualify for the new DNA database, we draw upon the federal
government's own data sources. The Bureau ofJustice Statistics
has published two specialized reports on sex offenders: one on
child victimizers87 and another on sex offenders generally.8
These reports virtually ignore sex offenders under federal cus-
tody, with the exception that there is one reference noting that
about 1% (875) of federal inmates in 1994 were serving time for
a sex offense involving a victim who was a minor." Thus, not
even the federal government's own specialized reports pay
much attention to that segment of the sex offender population
that is currently in federal custody. There are however, other
sources from which to validate the small number of such of-
fenders. The FederalJustice Statistics Database provides the fol-
lowing counts of sex offenders under federal custody: 1997-
871 inmates (113 rapists and 758 other sex offenders); 1996-
811 inmates (123 rapists and 688 other sex offenders); and
1995-731 inmates (120 rapists and 611 other sex offenders).?
Since the new database will likely collect inmates' DNA prior to
release, the number of eligible inmates exiting the federal
See supra note 16.86 See id
8
7 LAWRENcE GREENFELD, BUREAU OFJUSTIE STATISTIcS, HILtD VICrMIZzi: VIOLENT
OFFENDERS AND THEIRVIcuaMS (1996).
88 LAWRENCE GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFEN-
DERS (1997).
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prison system each year becomes crucial to prospectively esti-
mate the workload of the new database. The number of sex of-
fenders exiting federal prison in recent years are: 1997-348
inmates (28 rapists and 320 other sex offenders); 1996-328
inmates (22 rapists and 306 other sex offenders); and 1995-
249 inmates (29 rapists and 220 other sex offenders).9'
It should be very clear that, when compared to other of-
fender groups, these numbers are extraordinarily small. For the
last three years for which the above data are available, on aver-
age there were 811 sex offenders in federal custody, and 308
such offenders were released each year.92 According to the Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons home page on the Internet, the official
population count as of September 2, 1999 was 116,775 in-
mates.93 Using the Bureau of Justice Statistics 1% estimate,
there would be 1,168 sex offenders in custody. Thus, we ask
again, why such a substantial line item for a new database which
will involve such a small number of offenders? Using the indus-
try rate of $50 per DNA test from a blood sample, it would cost
about $584,000 to test every federal inmate currently in custody,
or alternatively, it would cost about $154,000 to test the 308 or
so who would be expected to be released in any given year. One
certainly wonders why the budget request asked for $5.3 million.
In the final analysis, it would appear that the new Federal Con-
victed Offender DNA Database will hardly be cost-effective. We
should all look forward to seeing whether such an extravagant
budget is accompanied by significant crime reduction. Of
course, if the analyses reported herein are any indication, we
will all be very disappointed in the results.
It would seem that, given the questionable effectiveness of
DNA in forensic settings, especially with respect to the value of
DNA databases, public officials would be hesitant, or at least
proceed slowly, in proposing costly DNA databases. However, as
we will show in the following section, there has indeed been a
rush to judgment that such databases are highly desirable, if not
fundamentally necessary, in the fight against criminals.
9t Id.
93Federal Bureau of Prisons (visited Sept. 2, 1999) <http://www.bop.gov/>.
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IV. FUTURE DNA MINING?
Convicted sex-offenders? No problem here. They're all a
bunch of sick recidivists anyway. All convicted felons? Sure,
why not? Maybe they'll think twice next time. All people ar-
rested? Well, it's a little tougher here, but sure, the cops are
good guys and they can't arrest you without probable cause
anyway. Everyone at birth or when we get our driver's license
renewed? Well, maybe this is what is needed to end crime alto-
gether. After all, if everybody knows that their DNA is on file
and, consequently, that they will be caught every time for every
crime, then no one would commit crimes. This hypothetical
debate is happening in state legislatures everyday. This section
of the paper is devoted to the future of DNA databases.
A. WHAT THE FUTURE MAY HOLD
"Uncle Sam Wants You!" was the familiar slogan used to re-
cruit young men for military service. Now, it might be more ap-
propriate to say that "Uncle Sam Wants Your DNA!" On March
1, 1999, Attorney General Janet Reno asked a national commis-
sion to study the legality of taking DNA samples from everyone
arrested instead of just the convicted sex offenders and violent
felons currently permitted by law.9 The committee's recom-
mendations are not available yet, but it would be a safe bet to
predict at least some expansion over the current status quo.
Louisiana is the most striking example of the expansionist ten-
dencies these DNA databases have, but New York City, North
Carolina, and England are also highly illustrative.95 At least one
poll shows that people are split almost evenly on the issue of
whether DNA samples should be taken from everyone arrested.
Of 9,751 responses, 54.4% answered yes, 41.6% said no, and
3.9% were not sure.' With such a slim margin of support, one
may properly ask whether any policy should be enacted. For is-
9 Richard Willing, Reno: Study Broad DNA Testing, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 1999, at Al.
"See Weedn & Hicks, supra note 13.
USA TODAY, "Quick Question"Internet poU, (Mar. 2, 1999) <http://vote.ieinc2.com
/usatoday/News.ax? ... Its&VoteID=648&VotedFor$='PrivateGarbageX>. As this poll
was taken online, sampling methodology is obviously an important factor in consider-
ing how much weight the results should be given.
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sues as serious as those DNA databases present, it might be ap-
propriate to only enact legislation that captures a broader con-
sensus and approval by the populace.
Aside from these calls for moves to the very limit of permis-
sible sampling, other states are enacting laws or have enacted
laws expanding their DNA database "trigger mechanisms.
Colorado passed a bill mandating DNA tests for certain felonies
involving bodily harm as a condition of the felon's parole.98
Many of the states that currently restrict their databases to sex
offenders are considering expansion to bring them more in line
with the majority of jurisdictions which allow DNA profiling for
some or all felony convictions."
1. Possible Scenarios
Although, in theory, there would seem to be an infinite
number of possible DNA database systems which can be devel-
oped to take advantage of DNA technology and provide fertile
ground for DNA mining, in reality, there are really just seven
likely outcomes.
a. No DNA Databases at All
The option of no DNA databases at all seems highly unlikely
now that every state in the union has a DNA database system ei-
ther in operation or under development. Given the alleged ad-
vantages that DNA has for crime-solving activities, and its
secondary effects on crime prevention, one would not be too
adventuresome to predict that these databases are here to stay
whether we like it or not.
b. Just Sex Offenders
This was the early trend, but as advancements in DNA tech-
nology continue-and they will-it remains to be seen whether
DNA databases will continue to be limited to just these types of
offenders. If society's goal is to prevent and catch this type of
"For purposes of this paper, we will refer to the conduct that results in inclusion
in a database as "trigger mechanisms."
"1999 Colo. Sess. Laws H.B. 1235.
See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
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criminal activity, then it serves its purpose well. However, if so-
ciety feels the need to expand its crime-solving abilities, these
databases will be broadened accordingly.
c. All Persons Convicted of Felony Offenses
This trend is becoming more popular, as it meshes nicely
with the "get tough" on crime mentality among the general
population. Further, it catches some criminals who would not
otherwise be included under the sex offender-based programs.
For example, if a criminal was to rape and kill his victim, this is
likely to be classified as a murder, and not a sex offense. Thus,
the offender would not be subject to inclusion in the database,
even though this is precisely the type of heinous crime that the
sex-offender database was designed to prevent.' °°
d. All Persons Convicted
Under such a system, every conviction would result in a
DNA database record. This might have a real and substantial
impact on a person's desire to commit future criminal acts.
However, it is not clear that this would be worth the consider-
able expense and effort such an undertaking would entail. As
technology becomes cheaper, faster, and more user friendly, it
might make such programs less cost-prohibitive. One has to
wonder how useful the inclusion of someone who was arrested
for a so-called "victimless" crime, such as gambling, would be. It
seems doubtful that a person who was arrested for betting $50
on the Bulls to beat the Lakers would significantly improve the
capability of the database to identify serial rapists. On the other
hand, that bettor may just be the one person the police were
looking for.
e. All Persons Arrested for Felony Offenses
The problem here, and with any other system which does
not require a conviction, is that it has a tremendous potential
for abuse. Where there is no judicial check on the intake proc-
" This hypothetical scenario was suggested by Dr. Dennis Loockerman. Interview
with Dennis Loockerman, Ph.D., Texas Department of Public Safety, CODIS Lab Su-
pervisor, in Austin, TX (Apr. 7, 1999).
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ess, it is difficult to convince those who view privacy as one of
our most cherished rights that DNA testing is appropriate in this
situation. This is particularly true today as we have increasingly
looked to courts, and not legislatures, as the primary guardians
of our liberties. 0'
f. All Persons Arrested
Soon to take effect in Louisiana, and proposed in New York
City, this is the current outer-limit of DNA databases. To date,
no system has pushed farther than this. This makes sense, but
perhaps only because the next alternative, total population in-
clusion, is a daunting prospect indeed. Thus, this appears to be
our current limit for the use of DNA databases. From one per-
spective, taking DNA from all arrestees may enable police to
solve crimes where only biological evidence was left. A criminal
who is arrested for one crime may be wanted in connection with
other crimes, but solely on the basis of DNA evidence recovered
from a crime scene. This would allow law enforcement authori-
ties to clear many unsolved crimes, which is obviously a tremen-
dous benefit to society. From another perspective, our criminal
justice system is based on the concept that we are innocent until
proven guilty.102 Thus, it seems perhaps a little too intrusive to
take DNA samples simply on the basis of suspected criminal ac-
tivity.
g. Total Population Inclusion
The final alternative is a database with a record of the DNA
profiles of all people. First, the logistical problems here are
enormous. How should this category be defined? Every person
in the state? A national database with every American citizen?
Taken at birth? What about those already born? Does every-
body have to give a sample at the local police station? Where do
we get the funding for this? Who would be in charge of it? How
do we deal with illegal aliens? What about resident aliens?
0, See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). See also
MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW PoLIICS OF SuPREME COURT
CONFIRMATIONS (1994).
" Cf In ReWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
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Tourists? Obviously, we cannot force other countries to main-
tain such a database, nor could we force them to share the data
with our law enforcement agencies. The international aspects
alone present almost insurmountable obstacles to the successful
implementation of such a system.
Aside from the practical obstacles, how would we feel about
such a database? Assume not only that such a database is possi-
ble, but further, that it is entirely cost-free to develop. No lost
time or productivity to give and collect samples; no funds re-
quired for the machines to do the analysis; no funds needed to
pay the technicians to organize the data. Would we still want it,
even if it were free? Reasonable people might disagree, even
with the completely fictional assumption that it would cost noth-
ing to create.03
These various scenarios follow a clear-cut progression. A
sex-offender-only database seems virtually unobjectionable. The
conviction-based databases seem a little more expansive, but still
they do not seem particularly troubling. After all, a judge or
jury found the accused guilty. That should be enough. The ar-
rest-based systems are the current thresholds, but here, we have
no assurance of guilt, only suspicion. With the total population
database, even if one takes cost out of the equation, it still seems
a little too futuristic. Something about it just seems contrary to
our notions of individual autonomy, and our sense of personal
privacy. These are the concerns that DNA databases ultimately
present. There are no easy answers. In fact, there are very few
easy questions.
B. DO WE WANT TO GO THERE?
"Better living through chemistry" was a popular slogan
many years ago describing how science could make our lives
better. It may be even more appropriate to use it today. Thank-
fully, the notion of privacy has not been lost in the debate. Civil
1" As this paper was in the final stages of completion, one of the authors was the
victim of a random act of theft. An unknown thief broke a window in his car, and re-
lieved him of approximately $750 worth of personal property. As a victim, he might
support total database inclusion in the hope that the perpetrator will be caught; as a
civil libertarian, he instead chalks this up to the price of personal privacy and free-
dom. It is a difficult balance, to be sure.
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libertarians are answering the call, 0' and state legislatures are
not blind to the issues themselves. Aside from pure privacy
concerns, there are legitimate fears about misuse of these data-
bases. Other concerns such as the integrity of the DNA analysis
process, and whether we should now revisit heretofore accepted
rules regarding things such as statutes of limitations are key is-
sues which must be resolved.0 5
Once the DNA is on file, concerns arise as to what other
uses it may be put to. This has been called "function creep" by
one leading commentator.' 6 To allay these concerns, almost
every DNA database statute on the books contains provisions to
avoid such improper usage. Rhode Island's DNA database act
provides: "DNA samples and DNA records collected under this
chapter shall never be used.., for the purpose of obtaining in-
formation about physical characteristics, traits or predisposi-
tions for disease." °7 Texas has an explicit prohibition against
the use of genetic data by insurance companies for illegitimate
purposes. Article 21.73 of the Texas Insurance Code states: "A
group health benefit plan issuer may not use genetic informa-
tion to reject, deny, limit, cancel, refuse to renew, increase the
premiums for, or otherwise adversely affect eligibility for or cov-
erage under the group health benefit plan."10° The statute fur-
ther holds refusal to submit to a genetic test may also not be
used in the same manner.19 Moreover, such prohibitions do
not apply only to people already born. The statute also man-
dates that "[n]o issuer of a group health benefit plan shall use
genetic information to coerce or compel a pregnant woman to
have an induced abortion. 10
Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director, American Civil Liberties Union, Address to
the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence (Mar. 1, 1999).
" Under proper conditions, DNA residue can remain viable for thousands of
years. See FISHER, supra note 2, at 153 (discussing the ability to reopen unsolved cases
years later now that DNA technology can generate leads).
'
0 6 See supra note 75.
7R.L. GEN. LAWs § 12.1.5-10(4) (1999).
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This debate will be carried out for years to come, and it is
reasonable to expect that as science continues to progress, even
more invasive and intrusive issues will be considered. A watch-
ful eye should ensure that we can embrace the benefits of this
technology, but without giving up too much in exchange. As
Part III.C focused on the monetary costs we incur to pay for
these databases, we must also focus on the costs in terms of sac-
rificing personal liberties as well.
V. EXISTING STATE OF THE LAW
Given the proliferation of DNA databases and the proposals
for wide expansion, it is desirable to review briefly the statutes
and regulations already "on the books" as of the time of this
writing. In so doing, we can examine the extent to which such
statutes are uniform, if not identical, thus providing, regardless
of jurisdiction, standardized procedures and policies concern-
ing database information. On the other hand, anomalous pro-
visions should be identified and their possible implications
raised.
In addition to the FBI's DNA database, 1 every state in the
union has established a DNA database in one form or another."'
This is likely due, at least in part, to the availability of federal
funding for such endeavors. 3 As a condition of the federal
government's support, each state's database must meet certain
criteria. For example, in order to receive a grant, the state must
require that DNA samples be obtained from "each person con-
victed of a felony of a sexual nature." Further, each state must
require that its standards for the processing and analysis of such
specimens are consistent with those established by the Director
... There appears to be a somewhat widely held view that 42 U.S.C. § 14132 was not
a clear enough mandate for the establishment of a DNA database for federal prison-
ers and the District of Columbia prisoners. Recently a bill was introduced in the
United States Senate to clarify Congress' intent. The Violent Offender DNA Identifi-
cation Act of 1999, was introduced on April 28, 1999. S. 903, 106th Cong. (1999).
", The FBI has been authorized to provide a database for the District of Columbia.
See 28 U.S.C. § 531 (1996).
"3 See suPra notes 12, 13, and 16.
" See supra notes 12, 13, and 16.
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of the FBI. 5 These various statutes are generally the same for
the most part, but there is substantial variance as to what groups
of people are forced to provide samples for inclusion in a data-
base. To provide a useful analytical framework, the Texas DNA
Database System116 will be reviewed in depth, followed by a dis-
cussion of other states' approaches, and then a discussion of
anomalous provisions of particular statutes will complete this
section.
A. THE TEXAS DNA DATABASE SYSTEM
The legislation creating Texas' DNA database system was
enacted in 1995.7 Chapter 411 of the Texas Government Code
covers the Texas Department of Public Safety, which has the re-
sponsibility for the DNA database.
1. Section 411.142: "DNA Database"
The Director [of the Department of Public Safety] shall "re-
cord DNA data and establish and maintain a computerized da-
tabase that serves as the central depository in the state for DNA
records."8 A "DNA record" means the results of a forensic DNA
analysis performed by a DNA laboratory and, if known, the
name of the person who is the subject of the analysis."" 9 The
director may "receive, analyze, store, and destroy a record,
blood sample, or other specimen .. . ."'20 The DNA database
must "be capable of classifying, matching, and storing the re-
suits of analyses of DNA and other biological molecules." 21 The
DNA database must also "be compatible with the national DNA
identification system (CODIS) used by the FBI to the extent re-
quired by the FBI to permit the useful exchange and storage of
DNA records or other information derived from those rec-
ords."22 The department shall "establish standards for DNA
"s See supra notes 12, 13, and 16.
"'TEX. GOV'T CODEANN. § 411.141 to -.154 (West Supp. 1998).
"'Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 595, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.
'TEx. GOV'T CODEANN. § 411.142(a).
"'Ii § 411.141(4).
'"Id. § 411.142(c).
2 Id. § 411.142(d).
'id. § 411.142(f).
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analysis... that meet or exceed the current standards for qual-
ity assurance... issued by the FBI."'2
2. Section 411.143: "Purposes"
The "principal purpose of the DNA database is to assist fed-
eral, state, or local criminal justice or law enforcement agencies
in the investigation or prosecution of sex-related offenses or
other offenses in which biological evidence is recovered."'24 In
criminal cases, the "purposes of the DNA database are only for
use in the investigation of an offense, the exclusion or identifi-
cation of suspects and the prosecution of the case."'2 Other
purposes of the database include:
1) assisting in the recovery or identification of human remains from a
disaster or for humanitarian purposes; 2) assisting in the identification
of living or deceased missing persons; and 3) if personal identifying in-
formation is removed: A) establishing a population statistics database; B)
assisting in identification research and protocol development; and C) as-
sisting in database or DNA laboratory quality control.
3. Section 411.144: "Regulation of DNA Laboratories; Penalties"
According to section 411.144:
[T] he director ... shall establish procedures for a DNA laboratory or
criminal justice or law enforcement agency in the collection, preserva-
tion, shipment, analysis, and use of a blood sample or other specimen..
. in a manner that permits the exchange of DNA evidence between DNA
laboratories and the use of the evidence in a criminal case.
1
2
The director may "at any reasonable time enter and inspect
the premises or audit the procedures of any DNA laboratory
that provides DNA records or DNA forensic analyses to the de-
partment... ."12, Eventually, there are plans for eight separate
1 Id. § 411.142(h).
"2 Id. § 411.143(a).






DNA labs which would feed data to the state's DNA database, al-
though none are presently operational.1'
4. Section 411.146: "Blood Samples or Other Specimens"
A person "collecting a blood sample or other specimen...
may not be held liable in any civil or criminal action if the per-
son collects the sample or specimen in a reasonable manner ac-
cording to generally accepted medical or other professional
practices. ' 3 A DNA laboratory may "analyze a blood sample.
collected under this section or other DNA specimen only: (1) to
type the genetic markers contained in the sample or specimen;
(2) for criminal justice and law enforcement purposes; or (3)
for other purposes described by this sub-chapter." '1 "If possible,
a second DNA specimen must be obtained from a suspect in a
criminal investigation if forensic DNA evidence is necessary for
use as substantive evidence in the prosecution of a case."
5. Section 411.147: "Access to DNA Database Information"
The director shall "establish procedures: (1) to prevent un-
authorized access to the DNA database; and (2) to release DNA
records, specimens, or analyses from the DNA database."3 3 The
department may:
[R]elease a DNA sample, analysis, or record only- (1) to a criminal jus-
tice agency for law enforcement identification purposes; (2) for a judi-
cial proceeding, if otherwise admissible under law; (3) for criminal
defense purposes to a defendant, if related to the case in which the de-
fendant is charged; or (4) if personally identifiable information is re-
moved, for: (A) a population statistics database; (B) identification
research and protocol development; or (C) quality control.1
The director shall "maintain a record of requests made under
this section. " 1=
" See Interview with Dr. Dennis Loockerman, supra note 100.
,'3 TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN§ 411.146(b).
SId. § 411.146(e).
2 Id § 411.146(f).
"'Id- § 411.147(a).
,, Id. § 411.147(c).
"I § 411.147(f).
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6. Section 411.148: "DNA Records of Certain Inmates" and Section
411.150: "DNA Records of Certain Juveniles"
The Texas DNA database can contain records that originate
from eight separate and distinct sources.""5 For our purposes,
however, the only two sources that are relevant to this paper are:
a person described by section 411.148 or 411.150, and a biologi-
cal specimen that is legally obtained in the investigation of a
crime, regardless of origin. Sections 411.148 and 411.150 de-
lineate the offenses for which an adult or a juvenile may be re-
quired to submit a DNA sample for inclusion into the database.
Both sections are essentially identical and cover the same of-
fenses. Under section 411.148 (a), an adult can be compelled to
submit a biological specimen essentially if that person commits
a sex-related offense, another felony offense with the intent to
commit a sex-related offense, murder, or aggravated assault.
3 7
"6 Specifically, the DNA database may contain records for the following.
a person described by Section 411.148 or 411.150;
a biological specimen of a deceased victim of a crime;
a biological specimen that is legally obtained in the investigation of a crime, regard-
less of origin;
an unidentified missing person, or unidentified skeletal remains or body parts;
a close biological relative of a person who has been reported missing to a law en-
forcement agency;
a person at risk of becoming lost, such as a child or a person declared by a court to
be mentally incapacitated, if the record is required by court order or a parent, conservator,
or guardian of the person consents to the record; or
an unidentified person, if the record does not contain personal identifying informa-
tion.
Id. § 411.142(g). See also section 411.149 which allows a person to "voluntarily sub-
mit a blood sample or other specimen to the department for the purpose of creating
a DNA record under this subchapter." Id. § 411.149.
117 Specifically, § 411.148(a) provides:
An inmate.., shall provide one or more blood samples or other specimens ... for
the purpose of creating a DNA record if the inmate is ordered by a court to give the sam-
ple or specimen or is serving a sentence for.
(1) an offense under one or more of the following Penal Code provisions:
(A) Section 21.11-indecency with a child;
(B) Section 22.011--sexual assault;
(C) Section 22.021-aggravated sexual assault;
(D) Section 20.04(a)(4)-aggravated kidnapping, if the defendant committed the
offense with intent to violate or abuse the victim sexually; or
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Also, under both section 411.148(a) and section 411.150(a), an
inmate can be forced to give a sample by order of a court. 8"
This would appear to give courts free reign over the DNA data-
base, but there is no evidence that any such orders have been
given to date.'39 Further, it appears that under the Texas statute,
an inmate can be forced to give a sample if the inmate is serving
a sentence for any offense and has been previously convicted of
a sex-related offense.
Under section 411.148(d), an inmate "may not be held past
a statutory release date if the inmate fails or refuses to provide a
blood sample or other specimen under this section." However,
"[a] penal institution may take other lawful administrative ac-
tion against the inmate."140 Section 411.150, dealing with juve-
niles, is substantially similar, although unlike section
411.148(d), the state is not prohibited from holding a juvenile
past his release date for failure to provide a sample.14' Aside
from this noteworthy omission, the sections seem to track each
other very closely.
7. Section 411.151: "Expunction of DNA Records"
The director shall "expunge a DNA record of a person from
the DNA database if the person: (1) notifies the director in writ-
ing that the DNA record has been ordered to be expunged...
and; (2) provides the director with a certified copy of the court
order that expunges the DNA record.",4 2 A person may "peti-
tion for the expunction of a DNA record.., if the person is en-
(E) burglary, if the premises are a habitation; and any party to the offense entered
the habitation with intent to commit a felony other than felony theft or committed or at-
tempted to commit a felony other than felony theft and the defendant committed the of-
fense with intent to commit a felony listed in (A) through (D) above, or
(2) any offense if the inmate has previously been convicted of:
(A) an offense described in Subsection (a) (1); or
(B) an offense under federal law or laws of another state that involves the same con-
duct as an offense described by Subsection (a) (1).
Id. § 411.148(a).
'd .eL §§ 411.148(a), 411.150(a).
" See Interview with Dennis Loockerman, supra note 100.
0 TEx. Gov'T CODEANN. § 411.148(d).
"' Id. § 411.150.
4 Id. § 411.151 (a).
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titled to the expunction of records relating to the offense to
which the DNA record is related.... ,3
8. Section 411.153: "Confidentiality of DNA Records"
"A DNA record stored in the DNA database is confidential
and is not subject to disclosure under the open records law...
.,,4 A person
commits an offense if the person knowingly discloses information in a
DNA record ... except as authorized by this chapter. An offense under
this subsection is a misdemeanor punishable by: (1) a fine of not more
than $1,000.; (2) confinement in the county Jail for not more than six
months; or (3) both the fine and confinement.
"
4
9. Section 411.154: "Enforcement by Court Order"
Section 411.154(b) states:
The court may issue an order requiring a person: (1) to act in compli-
ance with this subchapter or a rule adopted under this subchapter; (2)
to refrain from acting in violation of this subchapter or a rule adopted
under this subchapter, (3) to give a blood sample or other specimen; or
(4) if the person has already given a blood sample or other specimen, to
give another sample if good cause is shown.14
Orders issued under this section are appealable as criminal mat-
ters and are to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard.47
As of this writing, the Texas DNA database has produced a
total of four "cold hits."48 Currently, the Texas DNA database
has approximately 12,000 samples on file. There is presently a
backlog of approximately 7,000 samples which have been re-
ceived, but not yet analyzed.5 ° The analysis process of DNA
specimens takes about two to three days, using current technol-
'43 Id. § 411.151(b).
1Id. § 411.153(a).
' Id. § 411.153(b).
146Id. § 411.154(b).
17Id. § 411.154(c).
" See Rodriguez, supra note 41 (discussing cold hits).
"9 See Interview with Dennis Lookerman, supra note 100.
" 9Interview with Dennis Lookerman, supra note 100.
[Vol. 90
DNA DATABASES
ogy. 1 To date, the Texas DNA database has cost approximately
$1.8 million, and it is currently staffed by eleven individuals.
The Texas legislature has recently expanded sections 411.148
and 411.150 to include the offenses of murder, aggravated as-
sault, and certain burglaries. Interestingly, there is a differ-
ence of opinion in the Department of Public Safety as to exactly
how far the Texas DNA database should be expanded. The
CODIS lab supervisor is of the opinion that just adding murder,
certain assaultive offenses, and burglary is all that is necessary,
while one DNA crime lab technician we interviewed would like
to see all arrests be included."" While this finding is not entirely
surprising, it is indicative of the contrasting views related to the
expansion of these databases.
The Texas DNA database statute is fairly representative of a
number of the DNA database provisions of other states. Now
that a review of the Texas statute is complete, it can be com-
pared and contrasted with those of other states.
B. OTHERJURISDICTIONS GENERALLY
At the outset, it is important to note that there are states
that have "trigger mechanisms" which are narrower than the
Texas version, and there are states whose statutes have a much
broader scope than Texas. However, the Texas statute accu-
rately depicts the nature and scope of its counterparts in many
other jurisdictions. While most of these statutes contain many
of the same general features, the critical divergence becomes
apparent when the analysis focuses on a single question: what
conduct will result in a person being forced to submit a DNA
sample for inclusion in a database? 56 This inquiry allows the
various statutes to be segregated and categorized, much like
"' Interview withJody Williams, Crime Lab Technician, Texas Department of Pub-
lic Safety, in Austin, Tex. (Apr. 7, 1999).
" See Interview with Dennis Lookerman, supra note 100.
" H.B. 1188, 76th Leg., R.S. (Tex. 1999) (enrolledJune 19, 1999, effective on Sep-
tember 1, 1999).
. See supra notes 116 and 138, respectively.
' "See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-&101-108 (1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:601-
620 (West 1998), respectively.
-"' See supra note 68.
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DNA samples themselves. Based on the variety among them, it
is hazardous to generalize about all other states. However, the
databases of other states can fairly be divided into two broad
groups.' These groups are: (1) states which include DNA only
from persons with convictions for felony sexual offenses;15 and
(2) states which include DNA from persons with convictions for
some or all of the state's felony offenses. 59 The reason that
these two classifications were chosen is that it enables one to
understand the expansionist tendencies regarding these data-
bases. Typically, they were set up in order to target sex offend-
ers only. However, they have tended to gradually expand to
encompass ever broader segments of the population.lrW
There are two states, however, which flatly do not fall within
this rubric. Louisiana and Iowa have statutes in a class all by
themselves. Louisiana currently has the most expansive statute
on the books. Beginning onSeptember 1, 1999, all persons "ar-
rested for a felony sex offense or other specified offense shall
have a DNA sample drawn or taken at the same time he is fin-
gerprinted pursuant to the booking procedure."16  As the stat-
ute now reads, a person can be forced to submit a DNA sample
merely for being arrested for a simple assault. Under Louisiana
law, a person who commits a simple assault "shall be fined not
more than two hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more
than ninety days, or both."162
Iowa's DNA database system is different than every other
state as well. The legislature deferred to the law enforcement
divisions of the state, and allowed almost total freedom for the
attorney general,o courts,1' and parole boardsss to define what
" The FBI database should be categorized in the second group, as it takes DNA
samples from "persons convicted of crimes." 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (a) (1) (1998).
' See e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-22 (1999).
59 See; e.g., ARK. CODEANN. § 12-12-1103 (Michie 1999).
160 Barry Steinhardt, Address to the National Commission on the Future of DNA
Evidence (Mar. 1, 1999).
6, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:603, -:609(A) (West 2000). "Other specified offense"
includes crimes ranging in seriousness from murder to simple assault. Id § 15:603.
'62 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:38 (West 1997).
163 IOWA CODE § 13.10 (1995).
'" Id § 901.2.
165 ML § 906.4.
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offenses should trigger inclusion in the DNA database. The At-
torney General shall "adopt rules.., for the purpose of classify-
ing felonies and indictable misdemeanors which shall require
the offender to submit a physical specimen for DNA profiling.
Factors to be considered shall include the deterrent effect of
DNA profiling, the likelihood of repeated violations, and the se-
riousness of the offense."166
The above emphasis on the "trigger mechanisms" might
overstate the similarities a bit, however, because there are sig-
nificant differences among the statutes exclusive of the issue as
to what offenses will result in someone's inclusion in a DNA da-
tabase. For example, some states require the offender to pay a
fee for the costs of running DNA analysis on their sample, while
others do not. 67 In addition, some states expressly provide a
cause of action against persons who violate the confidentiality
and anti-tampering provisions of statutes, while others do not.16
A few of these issues are worth viewing in the comparative con-
text as well.
C. DATABASE ISSUES
While the list detailed below is by no means exhaustive, it
does raise a number of important topics relating to the mechan-
ics of these databases. Consider the following questions:
1. Who has access to these databases?
Most states restrict access to law enforcement agencies,
court proceedings, and to a defendant in connection with the
defense of the charge (s) that gave rise to the DNA sample.' 9
'"IOWA CODE § 13.10 (1999).
7 Compare, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-5-670(A) (Law. Co-op. 1999) (mandatory $250
fee assessed against offender which cannot be waived by the court) with NEV. REv.
STAT. § 176.0915 (1999) ($250 fee, but with an undue hardship exception) and VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1933-36, 39 (1999) (no fee recoupment provision in the stat-
ute).
'" See R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-1.5-15(3) (1998) (aggrieved person may bring civil ac-
tion for damages, injunctive relief, and reasonable attorneys' fees).
'" SeeAI.-A CODE § 36-18-27 (1999).
20001 683
PAUL E. TRACY & VINCENT MORGAN
2. What security measures are commonly utilized?
Most states have penalties designed to combat unauthorized
use and tampering.
7 0
3. Does the statute grant immunity to those who draw samples?
Over thirty states allow some form of immunity, both from
criminal and civil liability arising out of the taking of a sample.
However, the jurisdictions are about evenly split on whether the
immunity covers negligence.7
4. Is reasonable force allowed to obtain a sample?
Missouri is one of only eight states that allow the use of rea-
sonable or necessary force to obtain a sample from uncoopera-
tive subjects.72
5. Does the statute allow the charging of fees for the expense of analyz-
ing the DNA?
Like more than one dozen states, South Carolina allows for
costs to be assessed against an offender.
1 73
6. Does the statute allow for expunction of DNA records?
Over three dozen states have included expunction provi-
sions expressly related to the DNA database. 74
The statutes as a whole have many similarities, but there are
key distinctions among them. The fact that these statutes are
subject to almost constant revision presents a rather large obsta-
170 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A.23 (1999) (penalties for misuse ranging from
Class B misdemeanor to Class B felony).
,7, See N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-13-04 (1999) (immunity provided sample was taken
according to generally accepted medical procedures); Wis. STAT. § 165.765(2) (a)
(1999) ("Any... person... is immune from any civil or criminal liability for the act,
except for civil liability for negligence in the performance of the act.").
'72 See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 650.055(2) (1999) ("Such force may be used as neces-
sary .. ").
7 Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-670(A) (Law. Co-op. 1999) (mandatory $250 fee
assessed against offender which cannot be waived by the court); with NEV. REV. STAT. §
176.0915 (1999) ($250 fee, but with an undue hardship exception).




cle to a comprehensive survey, and due to the rapidly changing
nature of these laws, any comparative study is really more like a
photograph that freezes a moment in time.
D. ANOMALOUS PROVISIONS
Despite a general congruence among the different statutes,
there are several unique provisions that are worth mentioning.
A small number of these anomalies are presented here for the
reader's consideration. First, Pennsylvania's statute ordered the
commissioner of the State Police to publish a notice when the
database was fully operational. Perhaps this was a legislative at-
tempt to circumvent any LamberFt claims (a claim which arises
when a person argues a lack of knowledge of a law's applicabil-
ity). Presumably, a person subject to inclusion in the database
would not be successful in challenging the law on the grounds
that it was unknown to the general public, or that it was not eas-
ily discoverable. By publicly announcing the readiness of the
DNA database system, a challenger would have a difficult task to
prevail on a Lambert claim. Second, South Carolina's fee re-
coupment provision involves a $250 charge which cannot be
waived by a court, and a prisoner may not be released from
prison on parole or even after the completion of his sentence
until the fee is paid.176 Third, Virginia, which had the first DNA
database in the country, now requires DNA samples for every
person convicted of a felony.177 However, unlawful use of the
database information can be a felony.1 78 Thus, by misusing the
DNA database, a person could easily find themselves the newest
member of the database.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the outset, this paper raised one simple question: are we
better off living in a world where our most basic and singularly
unique characteristics are on file, serving as a constant shadow
over our daily lives? The question suggests a brooding omni-
' Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
,76 S.C. CODEANN. § 23-3-670(A) (Law. Co-op. 1999).
'7VA. CoDEANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 1999).
'73 Id § 19.2-310.6.
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presence of big government that makes us uncomfortable. Yet,
if DNA databases could be proven to be of unparalleled value in
fighting crime, then the answer might be yes, other concerns
notwithstanding. In this vein, we have no quarrel whatsoever
with the earliest and most basic of DNA applications in the
criminal law: known suspect testing and post-conviction relief.
We agree that there is unparalleled value to the use of DNA test-
ing to match a particular suspect's DNA with that extracted
from trace evidence left behind at a crime scene. Similarly, can
there be a more justice-oriented application for DNA than to
use its exculpatory capabilities to exonerate persons who were
wrongfully accused and convicted? Moreover, aside from the
obvious moral issues, a wrongful conviction serves no purpose,
and consequently is of no value in our criminal justice system.
Each of these DNA applications should be used as extensively as
possible, not only as effective crime control measures, but more
importantly, as definitive tests of whether an accused, or even a
previously convicted person, is actually innocent.
Beyond these two applications of DNA testing per se, how-
ever, our inquiry concerning the spreading craze over DNA da-
tabases as a crime control measure does not offer similar
support. In fact, the analysis reported here of the best available
government crime data raises serious concerns that DNA data-
bases are proliferating and becoming ever more inclusive, and
the costs associated with collecting, testing, and storing the in-
formation are rising into the hundreds of millions of dollars.
These developments are occurring all across the country despite
the absence of convincing evidence that the DNA mining proc-
ess will strike gold as proponents have claimed.
We have demonstrated that DNA databases will not be
greatly successful in increasing the extent to which police solve
the vast majority of the seven FBI Index crimes. This was shown
to be the case because the vast majority of Index crimes are
property offenses, and this type of offense does not carry a high
potential for beneficial DNA testing because the usual property
offense crime scene is not likely to contain the perpetrators'
DNA, and even if it does, such evidence will seldom be looked
for, let alone collected and tested for comparison with the DNA
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databases. We also showed that DNA mining will be even less
beneficial for solving the vast majority of Non-Index crimes.
Again, we argued that the millions of less serious Non-Index
crime scenes hardly ever contain DNA-related evidence. We
further argued that even if such crime scenes did contain DNA
evidence, local law enforcement hardly has the necessary re-
sources to treat these offenses as though they deserved the in-
tensive crime scene effort that is usually reserved for serious
violent crimes against the person. In this regard, we noted that
it is often difficult enough to convince the police to dust for fin-
gerprints at a residential burglary, because the police know that
their search will likely be futile. Imagine, therefore, trying to
convince police to search the crime scene (usually outside) of a
robbery for such evidence as the perpetrator's hair, tissue, or
other residual evidence.
We also considered the value of DNA database evidence to
the prosecutorial function. We found that DNA evidence is not
used by a majority of prosecutors' offices across the country. We
did find that "big city" prosecutors relied heavily on DNA evi-
dence both at trial and during plea negotiations. However, this
extensive use pattern in the most populous areas must be dis-
counted by the fact that these offices handle only about one-
third of the serious crime in the United States. That is, the vast
majority of crime, about 64%, occurs in smaller jurisdictions,
which are served by prosecutor units that do not rely heavily on
DNA evidence, either at trial or during plea negotiations, re-
gardless of the severity of the crime being prosecuted. We
found that prosecutorial use of DNA is clearly a big city or large
county phenomenon, but the majority of crime is committed
and prosecuted elsewhere, thus diminishing the value of DNA
as a crime control measure at the macro level. Further, we also
found that even among the big city prosecutors, DNA evidence
use was restricted to mostly homicides, rapes, and other very se-
rious offenses.
We also considered the cost-effectiveness of DNA databases.
Here the results were quite convincing. At present, the DNA
extraction process is a highly expensive and time-consuming
process when considered in the aggregate. The costs associated
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with increased testing, especially the increased testing necessi-
tated by the more "inclusive" DNA database proposals are astro-
nomical when compared to the expected crime level benefits
associated with the databases. For example, we provided an ex-
amination of the soon-to-be-launched Federal Convicted Of-
fender DNA Database and found that, while it will cost
$5,335,000 the first year, the current total population of offend-
ers who will be included in the database numbers about 1,200
inmates. This translates to some $4,445 per inmate. If the costs
of analyzing a sample are only $50, then we must ask the ques-
tion: Where is the rest of this money supposed to go? Clearly, a
legitimate question remains: Are DNA databases and their di-
rect and more indirect or diffuse costs the most effective way to
spend scarce criminal justice resources? At this point, the an-
swer must be no.
Last, we considered various future scenarios and proposals
for various DNA database configurations. These proposals in-
clude very specific eligibility criteria, like persons convicted of
sex offenses or violent crimes, but they also include more ex-
pansive criteria like persons arrested, the general public, or
even newborns as has been endorsed by Mayor Giuliani of New
York City.17 We argued that there are actual financial costs, as
well as ethical and civil liberty costs associated with these ever
expanding DNA database proposals. The essential point is
clear. The only reason to bear the manifold costs associated
with DNA databases is if, and only if, it can be shown that a par-
ticular database configuration will be demonstratively successful
in solving crimes or easing prosecutions which would not be
possible otherwise. Thus, what good are the more expansive
(and expensive) database definitions like, "all persons arrested
for anything?" Our response is: "Not very good." The only da-
tabases that appear worthy of serious consideration are those
which focus on specific categories of criminals, like violent of-
fenders and sexual predators. It remains open to debate
whether such databases should contain just convicted persons
or arrested persons as well. However, the restriction to particu-
" Bruce Lambert, Giuliani Backs DNA Testing Of Newborns for Identification, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 17, 1998, at B4.
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lar offense types appears to be highly justified on the basis of
the demonstrative yield owing to crime scene issues and the well
recognized recidivism potential of violent offenders and sexual
predators. We should all look with great skepticism at proposals
for more inclusive eligibility. Further, we should demand that
the proponents of wider inclusion prove scientifically and une-
quivocally the crime level value of the more inclusive databases.
In proposing that DNA be taken from every person arrested ih
New York City, the Police Commissioner, Howard Safir has
stated that, "A professional burglar or car thief, for instance,
might leave skin or sweat cells when forcing open a door or
window. As long as there is one cell, you could use this to help
solve just about any crime you could think of."'so
Statements like this not only strain credibility, but give us all
reason to pause and wonder whether public officials have suc-
cumbed to a fatal case of DNA fever.
There are ever present dangers that the public will be swept
up in the same euphoria over DNA mining which proponents,
like Police Commissioner Safir, seem to believe is the best thing
to hit law enforcement since fingerprinting.8 1 Meanwhile, the
implications for privacy and other personal liberty issues, plus
the huge potential for abuse, should encourage us to keep look-
ing over Big Brother's shoulder even as he watches us. We can-
not stress enough the civil liberty issues, and perhaps, other
constitutional concerns, subsumed within the DNA database
craze. We endorse the recent comments of James Starrs, a
George Washington University Law Professor and Distinguished
Fellow of the Academy of Forensic Sciences, who cautioned
against the dangers of DNA databases. Starrs suggested, "Just
because it may serve some law enforcement purpose does not
mean the Constitution falls by the wayside. "1 2 Starrs also noted,
SSeeJohn Kifner, Safir Says DNA Proposal Would Cut Property Crime, N.Y. TIME, Dec.
13, 1998, at 151.
"" Recall the USA TODAY Internet poll discussed in Part IVA, supra, where more
than 50% of respondents approved of DNA testing and storage for all arrested peo-
ple. Due to the unscientific methodology of this poll, we are unable to determine
whether this is a knee-jerk response or the product of careful thought, but it never-
theless is illuminating as to the public's current views on DNA databases.
"" Mark Hansen, Banking on DNA, 85 A.B.A.J. 26-27 (1999).
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"I know I don't want the police to have something of mine
without having some specific reason and I think most people
probably feel the same way.",13 Further, we applaud Attorney
General Reno's inclusion of prosecutors, judges, criminal de-
fense attorneys, forensic scientists, and others to the National
Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence. By having such a
diverse and varied group of learned individuals, it is our hope
that all the issues raised in this paper and more will be thought-
fully discussed and debated, if not resolved. Perhaps when the
public realizes how invasive and how very expensive DNA data-
bases are becoming, there will be much greater scrutiny ac-
corded to the supposed benefits which many law enforcement
and other elected officials are quick to claim but slow to dem-
onstrate.
M Id.
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